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Competing Paradigms: Socioeconomic
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Pieter le Roux
I. IntroductionThe transition to a democracy in South Africa has often been called
a political miracle. Many, particularly those on the left, were surprised
that F.W. de Klerk acquiesced before his regime had been militarily
defeated. Others, particularly those on the right, were amazed that the
political transition did not lead to chaos. They expected the new gov-
ernment to adopt radical social and economic policies, which would
destroy the economy.
But in spite of the miraculous political transformation, the economy
is in the doldrums, and significant social transformation is more of a
dream than a reality, except for the privileged few. By this it is not
implied that much has not changed for the positive, but failing a much
more buoyant economy there will be insufficient resources to signifi-
cantly transform the social and economic position of the majority of
the people.
How can we comprehend what is happening in South Africa and
make informed judgments of potential future developments? Is our
only option to depend on the political scientists and econometricians,
the latter day astrologers? Like Tycho Brah, they may do impressive
empirical work, but in the end their predictions depend on far-fetched
assumptions, rather than on science.1 Or can we, as social theorists
used to believe, understand the future possibilities of a country
through a thorough understanding of its past and present circum-
stances? Can our theoretical insights together with an intimate knowl-
edge of the country enable us to understand South Africa’s potential
for social and economic transformation?
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This essay has three sections. In all three, the focus is on socioeco-
nomic development in South Africa. The first gives different perspec-
tives on the history of socioeconomic development in South Africa —
perspectives that will help you judge whether the political transition
was indeed miraculous. It concludes with a short discussion of some of
the methodological debates. The second section gives a short overview
of present socioeconomic realities, and in the third, a number of possi-
ble future scenarios for South Africa are considered.
II. What to Do about a Multi-Cultural, Multi-Paradigmatic Reality
An investigation of this multi-cultural, multi-paradigmatic situation is
bound to be controversial. The same social and economic reality
appears very differently depending on vantage point. Class position,
the culture, and the scientific paradigm into which one has been social-
ized may well determine what one sees. How, then, does one present
an objective perspective of the South African social and economic real-
ity when it can be viewed from so many permutations of class, culture,
and paradigm? Or is one inevitably the prisoner of one’s specific back-
ground? Is a pervasive intellectual apartheid inevitably part of any
academic discourse? Do we have to accept as insurmountable the
marked differences in people’s perceptions of reality, caused by differ-
ences in class, in culture, and in intellectual background?
There is no doubt that one can easily be the prisoner of a given view
of reality. However, this essay is written in the conviction that even
though one is often the prisoner of a paradigm, this is not inevitable.
One can straddle different perspectives if one really tries. It is possible
for those who immerse themselves in different cultures or opposing
scientific traditions to see reality from a number of different points of
view. What is more, one can, in the words of Karl Mannheim, attain a
certain relational objectivity. This does not, as Mannheim would have
it, assure the attainment of a “truth,” but it does enable one to claim
that some aspects of a theory have been falsified. From the outside,
opposing views often seem absurd, but, as Wittgenstein warned, “crit-
icism without understanding is vacuous.” Only when one has
immersed oneself into all the existing perspectives and carefully con-
sidered the internal logic and the available evidence, is one justified to
reject a position.
It is not possible, within the confines of this essay, to present the
case for this multi-paradigm falsificationist methodology in any detail.
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Suffice it to say that once one has thoroughly engaged oneself in com-
peting points of view, it may be possible to reject some views. Karl
Popper’s methodology can be applied on the condition that the mem-
bers of the jury must go to the considerable effort to educate them-
selves about all the dominant paradigms. One cannot be a member of
this scientific jury if one is the prisoner of any particular paradigm.
III. Different Understandings of South Africa’s 
Socioeconomic Transformation
There are many different stories explaining past patterns of socioeco-
nomic development in South Africa — each of them giving a different
understanding of what was historically important. Within English his-
toriography, the liberal and the Marxist (also known as revisionist) tra-
ditions have been dominant for many decades. However, there was
also a time when history was written from the perspective of the
empire builders. And today a postmodern skepticism prevails in much
of the discourse of English historians, even those with some commit-
ment to Marxism or liberalism.
During the first few decades of this century, the Afrikaner national-
ists had an interpretation of history that was anti-colonialist and in
some ways similar to that later developed by the dependency theorists
in Latin America. However, it was usually also tinged by a strong incli-
nation to racism, and in the 1930s and ’40s, many Afrikaner national-
ists were attracted to a fascist understanding of socioeconomic reality
— a perspective which is even today popular among right wing
extremists, who have some significant support among the economi-
cally marginalized Afrikaners. On the other hand, there has also been a
more radical tradition among the small but nevertheless not insignifi-
cant group of Afrikaners. However, in recent years, the economically
successful Afrikaners have been converted to a liberal understanding
of social and economic issues, as witnessed by the massive switch dur-
ing the recent election to support the liberal Democratic Party and
away from the former bastion of Afrikaner nationalism, the New
National Party (NNP).
Many African writers have either had a liberal or a Marxist interpre-
tation of socioeconomic reality, and even today these two traditions
have committed adherents. There is also an Africanist tradition, which
in the 1970s evolved into a more inclusive black consciousness analy-
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sis. Although it may not be as well developed in academic terms, it
played a most significant role in transforming South Africa.
Four different perspectives on developments in South Africa are
now presented in order to provide a more complete picture of our past
experience, and to provide an entry point for considering the possible
futures South Africa may face.
A. An Afrikaner Nationalist History
A dominant view among Afrikaners, and probably among most white
South Africans, is that South Africa has become a relatively modern
society because of the contribution made by the whites. By 1806, when
the English permanently occupied the Cape, the Dutch-speaking white
population numbered only 20,000, many of them descendents of the
Dutch free burghers, who arrived when Jan van Riebeeck settled in the
Cape in 1652, and the French Huguenots, who arrived in 1688. Never-
theless, according to the white view of history, this was already a
colony vastly more developed than any of the other colonies Britain
would occupy in Africa. Afrikaner history would have it that the
Afrikaner pioneers, who trekked inland from 1836 onwards, brought
stability and order to areas where the African tribes had lived in con-
flict. At the Battle of Blood River, they defeated the Zulus who, under
Tshaka, had subjugated many of the other tribes.
The Afrikaners often used to think of themselves as a freedom lov-
ing people who trekked away from British imperialism in an attempt
to establish democratic republics, drawing on the same principles as
the American one. Although the Boer republic in Natal soon had to be
disbanded when Britain added Natal to its colonies, the relative inde-
pendence of the republics in the interior of South Africa was recog-
nized by Britain under the Sand River Convention of 1854. This
convention was revoked with the discovery of diamonds in Kimberley
in 1876. Not only did the British readjust the borders to claim Kimber-
ley, which actually was part of the Orange Free State, but in 1881 they
also invaded the South African Republic (Transvaal), only to be
defeated by the Boers at Majuba.
After the discovery of gold, it was only a matter of time before
Britain, egged on by the mining magnates in Johannesburg and by
Cecil John Rhodes, declared War on the Boer republics (after an
abortive raid by Jameson in 1896). In the Anglo-Boer War, called the
Engelse Oorlog (English War) or the Tweede Vryheidsoorlog (Second War
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of Independence), the British empire had to fight for nearly three
years, from October 1899 to May 1902, to subjugate the two Afrikaner
republics. Although history books call it the last of the Gentleman Wars,
the price the Boer republics paid was horrendous. More than a quarter
of the Dutch speakers in these republics were exterminated. 6,000 Boer
fighters were killed on the battle field or died in captivity, and another
26,000 women and children died in concentration camps (or detention
camps, to use the terminology Queen Elizabeth II preferred in a recent
speech), after having been removed to them from the farms under the
scorched earth policy.
The Liberal Party, which had taken over in Britain, restored full
political rights to all white (male) South Africans in the new Union of
South Africa, which was established in 1910. By this time, it was clear
that Britain had not fought the war to bring freedom to black South
Africans, as many of the 20,000 black South Africans who died in the
war (the Anglo-Boer South African War, as the ANC government has
decided to call it) might have believed. The critical view, propagated
by J.A. Hobson (later editor of the Manchester Guardian) in his books
The South African War and Imperialism,2 that Britain fought the war to
serve the interests of the mining magnates and, in particular, their
need for free access to labor, is today widely accepted.
For the first three decades of the 20th century, there was an increas-
ing impoverishment of the Afrikaners. By the 1930s, the Carnegie
Commission found that one-third of the Afrikaners were impover-
ished. The English often blamed this poverty on the laziness and indis-
cipline of Afrikaners. An English magistrate (local judge), for example,
in his evidence to the Transvaal Indigency Commission in 1908,
claimed that indigency was caused by the fact that the Afrikaners
“bre(e)d like flies.”
Many Afrikaners, on the other hand, saw their poverty as the conse-
quence of British occupation during the War of Independence and of
the free market capitalism that was implemented by the South African
governments up to 1924. In a series of articles which appeared in 1916
in Die Burger, the Afrikaner newspaper of the Cape, the editor, D.F.
Malan, who became the first Afrikaner nationalist Prime Minister in
1948, gave explanations in some respects very similar to the depen-
dency theory to be developed by A.G. Frank.
By 1923, the white mine workers in Johannesburg rebelled when the
government wanted to allow black South Africans to do more respon-
sible work—the Communist Party played a prominent role, calling on
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the white workers of the world to unite. The Prime Minister, Jannie
Smuts (a University of Cambridge graduate), who as a Boer general
fought the British to the bitter end in the Anglo-Boer War, now turned
his soldiers on his own people. As a consequence, the Labour and the
National Party won the next election. The new government rejected
the laissez faire policies of the United Party — policies that favored the
established industries of Britain — and they went for a far more inter-
ventionist approach. The state established an iron and steel works
(ISCOR) and an electricity supply commission; it raised tariffs on
imports and announced a “civilized” labor policy on the railways and
in the post office; and it required that a similar policy (favoring white
and coloured employment) be implemented by companies contracting
with the government.
During the years of the Second World War, Smuts managed to
wrest control from the National Party (as Parliament split on the ques-
tion of whether to remain neutral, as the National Party wished, or to
support Britain). The old Boer general became a Field Marshall and
served in the British War Cabinet, but by 1948, the Afrikaner national-
ists again took control, gaining a majority of three seats in Parliament,
even though the United Party had a majority of the votes. The nation-
alists’ election manifesto promised to nationalize the gold mines — a
socialism with an ethnic goal — but they were bought off from radical
economic policies when Anglo-American sold General Mining at a
bargain discount price to Afrikaner interests. In the end, it was black
South Africa that was to pay a heavy price when the “first past the
post” system gave power to the Nationalist Party.
White poverty was addressed by adopting more and more mea-
sures to exclude Africans from the economy. As early as 1854, the
whites of the small republic of Orichstadt had prohibited the use of
guns by Africans, probably both for security reasons and because guns
gave the white hunters a very significant advantage. In 1913, the Mines
Act determined that only whites could be blasters and the Land Act
not only allocated only 13% of the land for African ownership but also
prohibited blacks from renting any land in “white South Africa,” thus
ensuring that black farmers often had no option but to work for
whites.
The “civilized” labor policy of the 1920s and ’30s excluded Africans
from many job opportunities. This in the ’50s led to Job Reservation,
which blatantly excluded Africans from many occupations in favor
primarily of white South Africans, but also at times explicitly in favor
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of “coloureds” (a coloured Labour Preference Policy was followed in
the Cape Province and in sections of the Eastern Cape). By default, the
Indian population at times also benefited from these regulations,
although “Asians” were not allowed to settle or to spend more than 24
hours in the Orange Free State. The Urban Areas Act of 1948 was used
to ensure that most African South Africans did not get permanent
rights in the so-called white South Africa, hence the migratory labor
system would continue for many decades to come. It also severely cir-
cumscribed the economic activities of small black shop holders, even
in the black urban areas, by limiting the size of their shops and the
products that they could sell.
Although it was primarily the Africans that suffered, the Indians
and the coloureds also experienced severe economic discrimination.
The most hurtful of these discriminatory measures was the Group
Areas Act of 1958, under which areas were reserved for a specific racial
group. This led to 100,000s of coloureds and Indians, who had homes
in the better parts of towns and cities, being resettled into less desirable
areas, usually much further away from the center of town. The most
notorious resettlement of Africans took place in Johannesburg, when
Africans were moved to Soweto from the vibrant Sophia Town (which
was then renamed “Triomf” — the Afrikaans for triumph — to become
a working class white Afrikaner suburb).
Although this exclusion of other groups from the economic oppor-
tunities offered by the rapidly growing South African economy dra-
matically enhanced the economic opportunities for white South
Africans, the Afrikaner nationalist interpretation of history sees these
measures merely as steps to protect the citizens of the country (white
South Africans) from “foreigners” coming from the black homelands
(many of which were given their “independence” in the ’60s and ’70s).
From an Afrikaner nationalist perspective, white poverty was over-
come by the self-help programs launched by the Reddingsdaadbond and
by sound economic policies followed by the Afrikaner nationalist gov-
ernment which ensured that during the half a century from 1920 to
1970, the South African growth rate was among the fastest in the
world. During this period, only Japan and Sweden grew at a similar
rate of about 5% a year.
There is no doubt that the South Africa First policies of the Afrikaner
nationalist government did lead to a more rapid industrialization than
would have been the case if the laissez faire policies of the old United
Party had been continued. Furthermore, the whites-only social democ-
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ratic welfare measures and the, in some respects, quite progressive
education policies based on the Danish education system which were
adopted from the 1930s onwards, together with the rapid expansion in
job opportunities for white South Africans (which arose both because
of the high rates of economic growth and because of the job reservation
policies), all contributed to the rapid elimination of the poor white phe-
nomenon.
The Afrikaner nationalist history emphasizes the proactive and pro-
gressive policies adopted by the nationalist government and the com-
mitment to hard work and self-help preached by the Reddingsdaadbond
and other cultural organizations tied to the Afrikaner Broederbond. The
constant message from the Afrikaner nationalist government was that
good governance and the good life could only be maintained by resist-
ing the increasing pressures for a majority government. The economic
failures of many of the postindependence African countries were given
much prominence in order to ensure that white South Africans would
continue to support the Afrikaner nationalist regime. Thus, even
though the economy faltered from 1976 onward as black resistance
and international pressure grew, the message was that the regime was
still much to be preferred to a black government.
B. The Liberal English Understanding of Socioeconomic
Development in the Apartheid Era
The liberal3 South Africans, primarily the upper class English, shared
the conviction of the Afrikaner nationalists that an African socialist
government would destroy the economy. However, they accused the
Afrikaner nationalists of preparing the ground for such a socialist
takeover. After all, apartheid inhibited the emergence of an African
middle class, and, in the absence of such a black middle class, liberal
editors often pointed out, socialism had a much greater appeal. What
is more, the apartheid measures undermined overall economic
growth, because a businessman could not allocate resources optimally.
For example, he had to employ scarce white labor (or at times coloured
labor) at higher wages than would have been required to attract the
African workers that could not be employed because of the job reser-
vation laws and the Coloured Preference Policy.
English South Africans view South African history very differently
from the Afrikaner nationalists. In their view, civilization arrived in
the Cape when the English permanently settled it. It was carried into
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the interior of South Africa on the backs of merino sheep in the 1850s.
The export of wool was seen as an economically far more significant
event than the Great Trek of the 1830s. And although English South
Africans would today deplore the concentration camps of the Anglo-
Boer war, they also have no doubts that Paul Kruger’s government
would not have been able to facilitate the development of a modern
South Africa in the wake of the discovery of gold and diamonds. There
were many instances of corruption in the Zuid-Afrikaanse Republiek (the
South African Republic, as the Transvaal was called by the Afrikaners)
and the attempts to give the farmers preferential access to black labor
was seen as economically shortsighted. Something thus had to be done
to wrest control from the backward Boers.
The most eloquent exposition of the liberal English views of the
early developments in South Africa is to be found in Native Labour in
South Africa, a book by Sheila van der Horst, based on a London School
of Economics Ph.D., Van der Horst, an Afrikaner by birth, who was to
become professor in Economics at UCT. It quoted Adam Smith to
argue that countries have to make a choice between opulence and
defense. The discriminatory measures adopted against black labor
were implemented to safeguard white security rather than to ensure
economic opulence. However, since they interfered with the free mar-
ket, they undermined the growth of the economy.
During the Second World War, the liberals hoped that there would
be a move to a free market. Hence, there was great sadness when the
Smuts government, victorious in their war against Nazi Germany, was
defeated by a party sympathetic to the Nazis. Whereas the Smuts gov-
ernment was on the verge of implementing the relatively progressive
Fagan report, which had proposed a more positive approach to urban
blacks and to black poverty in general, the Afrikaner nationalists
would now implement the crudest forms of apartheid.
In subsequent years, the refrain that policies adopted by the nation-
alist government interfered with the free market would be heard time
and again. Racial discrimination as well as attempts to protect local
industry was seen as economically irrational, pushing up costs and
undermining growth.
By the 1960s, a very deterministic version of Rostow’s stages of eco-
nomic growth was applied to South Africa by Michael O’Dowd, who
predicted that apartheid could not survive economic growth for more
than another few decades. From this perspective, the problem in South
Africa was Afrikaner racism and not the capitalist economy. In fact, a
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prerequisite for change was the growth of the capitalist economy, since
this would undermine the logic of apartheid. Liberals also pointed out
that the Soweto riots took place precisely because there was a rapid
expansion in the number of black students in secondary schools in the
’70s, due to the need for more skilled labor following the rapid eco-
nomic growth in the ’50s and ’60s. Similarly, the pass laws were
scrapped in the ’80s as they increasingly came into conflict with the
needs of a modern economy. Capitalist growth was thus set to under-
mine apartheid.
C. A Marxist Perspective on Social and Economic Development
The Marxist historians and social theorists looked at the same reality
and came to precisely the opposite conclusion. Apartheid was not seen
to be in conflict with a capitalist economy. On the contrary, they
argued, apartheid evolved exactly because it served the functional
needs of capitalism. The migratory labor system provided the mines,
the farmers, and the factory bosses with super-exploitable workers.
Since it was possible for the wife and children of the workers to eke out
a subsistence living for themselves in the Bantustans,4 the capitalists
did not have to pay a wage sufficient for the reproduction of the fam-
ily. Only the essential needs of the worker himself had to be met.
The fact that South Africa’s rate of economic growth between 1920
and 1970 was among the highest in the world seems to lend support to
the Marxist contention that apartheid was not in conflict with the eco-
nomic system. A liberal could, of course, always retort that the econ-
omy would have grown even faster had it not been for apartheid. It
has also been shown that from the ’50s onward, many of the reserves
could, in any case, no longer produce enough for households to sub-
sist. A sophisticated liberal response to the Marxist interpretation was
the argument by Merle Lipton that the mining and agricultural sector
did in fact benefit from apartheid, whereas apartheid was increasingly
imposing costs on the manufacturing sector.
The most important difference between the Marxists and the liberals
was, however, not in their interpretation of history, but in their pre-
scription of how society had to be transformed. The liberals believed in
an evolutionary transformation which would inevitably happen if the
market forces were let loose to destroy the system of apartheid. The
Marxists, on the other hand, argued strongly in favor of a revolution-
ary transformation. Racial capitalism was a unified system. Both
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apartheid and capitalism had to be destroyed if society was to change
for the better, and this would call for a revolution that would smash
both the structures of apartheid and of capitalism.
If one looks at the actual dénouement of the African drama, one may
be tempted to conclude that both groups were wrong. Change came
because of the radical strategies to isolate and undermine the South
African economy rather than because of its rapid growth. But it was a
realization that the black community, conscientized by the 1976 Black
Consciousness uprisings, would never accept the separate develop-
ment ideology, as well as the economic sanctions that got the national-
ist government to the negotiation table, rather than any real military
threat. The collapse of the Soviet Union, even though it meant that the
ANC could muster less of a credible military threat, in fact contributed
to the settlement, for it became clear to the nationalist government that
the likelihood of South Africa being transformed into a radical socialist
state had radically diminished.
In the end, the settlement, although it was brought about by means
that were opposed by the liberals, brought along an outcome that they,
rather than the Marxists, would favor. Contrary to what the liberals
argued, an onslaught on the economy was needed before apartheid
was disbanded. Because of the unexpected but, viewed ex post, entirely
reasonable willingness of the National Party to settle at an early stage,
the change was in fact evolutionary rather than revolutionary. In the
end, the free market was strengthened by the abandonment of the
apartheid state. Capitalism did not need apartheid to survive. Stagna-
tion rather than economic growth brought about the change, but the
change was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. There were thus
serious flaws in the argument of both the liberals and the Marxists.
D. An Africanist Perspective
There has been a longstanding Africanist perspective on the nature of
social and economic change, generally not well represented in the aca-
demic literature. In some ways, because of the potential to mobilize
both traditionalist and radical Africans, this tradition always posed a
very significant potential threat to the white regime. There was a
strong element of Africanism in the protests the Congress movement
launched against the pass laws in the ’50s. And the first severe crisis of
the regime followed the massacre at Sharpeville in 1961, when protests
led by the Pan African Congress rocked the white establishment. In the
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end, it was under the banner of Black Consciousness that not only the
African youth, but a very significant proportion of all those not classi-
fied as white were mobilized.
An extensive literature sprung up as the Black Consciousness move-
ment, led by Steve Biko, developed a very nuanced understanding of
how to challenge white domination, an understanding which liberals
and Marxists first rejected. Although it was neither militarily nor eco-
nomically powerful, the Black Consciousness movement forever
changed the black South African understanding of social reality. And
although the apartheid regime survived the Soweto uprisings in 1976,
it lost its ideological hold on black South Africans. The younger gener-
ation would never again believe in the apartheid ideology nor would
it, on any significant scale, cooperate with apartheid structures.
Black Consciousness not only reinterpreted the present. It reinter-
preted history through its critiques of the role of different sectors of the
white society. For example, the “heroic” trek of the whites to civilize
the interior was seen as an occupation of African territory. The role of
the liberal missionaries was seen through different eyes. Although
they might well have opposed some of the worst excesses of colonial
rule, they were also instrumental in undermining traditional black cul-
ture and encouraging habits in dress and abode which served the
interest of the white manufacturers of clothing and construction mate-
rial, often at a high material and psychological cost for the Africans.
Even the traditional African burial rites were effectively undermined.
There is no doubt that the definitive Black Consciousness or
Africanist history of South Africa still needs to be written. The under-
mining of the traditional black way of life soon after the whites moved
into the interior of South Africa has been documented. The massive
slaughter of big game simply to export skins; the indenture of black
children when their parents had been killed by the Voortrekkers; the
Glen Grey Act, passed by Cecil John Rhodes in the Cape Parliament,
demanding cash tax payments by blacks in order to “encourage” them
to work in the mines and thus become “civilized;” the agreements with
the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique to pay half of the wages of
black mine workers — all this shows how desperately white South
Africa needed black labor. Indeed, this was a need from the very
beginning. During the first few decades after settlement by the Dutch,
a single slave was worth more than the entire farm. For most of South
Africa’s history, except for the last two to three decades, there was talk
of a shortage rather than a surplus of labor.5
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Much of South African history turns on the attempts by white South
Africa to ensure that black labor would be available to work for them,
including, as was noted above, the Anglo-Boer War. Black labor
played a crucial role in building up the economy. And yet, even today,
most of the wealth of the economy is in the hands of whites. There is
no doubt that in the minds of most black South Africans the question is
not merely how to deal with black poverty, but also how to ensure that
there is a shift in the ownership of the companies that dominate the
economy.
There are some similarities between the positions of those who in
recent years have laid claim to be the custodians of the Black Con-
sciousness movement and the Afrikaner nationalists. Sometimes their
views of needed economic changes are romantic rather than rooted in
any fundamental understanding, and at times socialism is defined as
ownership by blacks rather than by whites, and not as the socialization
of the means of production. This is very similar to the position adopted
by radical Afrikaners in the ’30s, when socialism was defined as own-
ership by Afrikaners rather than by the English.
But even though some of the economic arguments by those in the
Black Consciousness movement may at times be rather imprecise, this
does not take away from what I would argue is an incontrovertible
fact, namely, that the white regime lost its dominance more because of
the successful challenge to white supremacist thinking developed by
the Black Consciousness movement in the 1970s, than because of the
significant military resources made available to the liberation move-
ments by the Soviet Union.
Although the Black Consciousness movement may at present be in
the hands of those on the political fringes, Africanist thinking is central
to some of the new approaches within the ANC. A rebirth is taking
place in serious African scholarship. Already in the first decade or two
of the 1900s, Sol Plaatje, one of the founders of the ANC, brought in an
African understanding of history. This tradition is likely to be devel-
oped more strongly in the next decade or two.
IV. Complementary Stories or Incommensurable Paradigms?
What is to be made of the very different interpretations of South
Africa’s history? In many respects, stories told from different vantage
points are, of course, complementary. To the extent that this is the case,
viewing social and economic change from different perspectives gives
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one a more complete picture. However, what does one do when the
stories come into conflict with each other? How does the social scien-
tist adjudicate between competing understandings of social reality?
One option is to accept the Kuhnian postulate that paradigms are
incommensurable and that there are no neutral scientific criteria by
which to weigh contradictory claims. Paul Feyerabend argued that this
would imply a methodological anarchism — anything goes! This posi-
tion, tolerant as it may be, does not help social actors much when they
wish to attain a certain goal. For example, how was one to destroy
apartheid? Was South African capitalism so dependent on apartheid
that it would defend it to the bitter end? Or would capitalist develop-
ment, as the liberals argued, create the conditions under which
apartheid would be undermined? At the time these debates were at
their height, the outcome was not clear.
According to the methodological anarchist, both of these positions
could be right, and therefore both were to be tolerated. The Marxists,
of course, argued that their position was clearly based on science, and
that the liberals were but espousing bourgeois ideology to defend their
own vested interests. On the other hand, liberals argued that their
position was to be accepted either, if they were old style positivists,
because it had been proven to be true, or, if they were Popperians,
because the opposing paradigms were false.
It is now clear, only a few years later, that those Marxists who
argued that capitalism had to be overthrown if the system of apartheid
was to be disbanded were clearly wrong. Of course, one could still
argue, as many Marxists do, that social and economic apartheid are
still with us, and that only the introduction of socialism can change
this. However, it cannot be denied that the political system of
apartheid was disbanded because of a political compromise between
the Afrikaner Nationalist Party and, in particular, its leader at the time,
F.W. de Klerk, and the ANC and its leader at the time, Nelson Man-
dela. Most Marxists argued even shortly before it happened that such a
dénouement was impossible. In fact, those of us who even dared to
mention the possibility of such an outcome were denounced.
Economic liberals, on the other hand (particularly those who
believed in Rostow’s stages of growth model), argued that apartheid
would be undermined if the capitalist economy was allowed to grow.
They denounced sanctions and military actions against the South
African regime as actions that would but delay the inevitable transi-
tion to a more democratic society. There is little doubt in my mind that
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the economic pressures and the prospect of a drawn out and destruc-
tive military conflict did play an important role in bringing the nation-
alist regime to the negotiating table but that the liberal analysis was
also seriously flawed. However, the liberals could always argue that
the transition would have taken place more quickly had there not been
economic and military pressure. At least they are not in the position in
which a type of transformation took place that they had categorically
stated was impossible.
Even after the much-debated transition has taken place there is
room for debate. However, the honest liberal and honest Marxist
would have to concede that both these analyses were seriously flawed.
Although one at times has to live with ambiguities if one is to be an
honest social scientist, the accumulated experience of comparative
societies often does provide unambiguous answers. Anything does not
go, despite the claims of the methodological anarchists.
However, statements like the Afrikaner nationalist contention that
blacks would never be able to govern a country successfully did not
have to wait for five years of a successful black government to be
rejected. Even at the time they were made, these views were clearly in
conflict with the available evidence. Both in terms of their internal
logic and in terms of their understanding of what had happened in
other societies, these views were untenable.
In the final section of this essay, when looking at different prescrip-
tions of what could be possible future developments in the social and
economic spheres, more illustrations are given of the contention that
one can dispose of views even though all the evidence within the spe-
cific context is not yet in.
V. Understanding the Present—Different Levels of Social 
and Economic Development in the New South Africa
A. The Importance of Presenting Statistics According to 
Population Group
To understand the realities of social and economic development in any
country, one should not simply present average statistics. One should
separately consider the position of different groups and classes. Given
its history, this is particularly true in the case of South Africa. As a con-
sequence, not too long ago those on the left were inclined to do away
with population classification because it was seen as racist, but today it
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is generally people on the right who are arguing for an undifferenti-
ated statistical picture.
In this section, a short overview is given of the most relevant statis-
tics; firstly, those that give a picture of the economic realities, and then
those statistics that give us some understanding of social realities.
B. Per Capita Income, the Gini Coefficient, and the 
Distribution of Wealth
South Africa has a total GDP of about $120 billion or, in terms of South
African Rand, its GDP is in excess of R700 billion. South Africa thus
produces more than a third of the geographical product of the whole
of sub-Saharan Africa. This may seem to be quite an impressive GDP
until one puts it into an international context. For example, given the
fact that the American GDP is about $7100 billion, South Africa’s GDP
is slightly more than 1% of the American GDP. In fact, during 1999
alone, the increase in the American GDP was virtually three times the
entire South African GDP or about equal to the total GDP of all the
sub-Saharan African countries. South Africa is a big player in sub-
Saharan Africa, but Africa is a very small player in the world economy.
Officially, South Africa’s population is approximately 42 million.
(South Africa’s total population is about equal to the number of new
babies born each year in India.) Although this is probably a slight
underestimation,6 for purposes of calculating per capita income this
would suffice. In terms of this population figure, the per capita GDP in
South Africa is about $3,000. This is about one-tenth of the American
per capita income (and about ten times that of many of the poorer
African countries). However, although things such as cars and com-
puters are cheaper in the U.S., most other things are more expensive.
In terms of purchasing power parity, the per capita income in South
Africa is estimated to be equal to about $6,000, or one-fifth the Ameri-
can per capita income.
From this it does not follow that the average South African has a per
capita income which, in purchasing power parity terms, is equal to
one-fifth of the American per capita income. Because a very high pro-
portion of income goes to the top income earners, the median income
is significantly lower than the average income. This is true both in the
U.S. and in South Africa. However, although income in the U.S. is very
unequally distributed when compared to the situation in many Euro-
pean countries, the situation in South Africa is worse. Indeed, accord-
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ing to World Bank calculations, the South African Gini coefficient —
one of the statistical measures most commonly used to estimate
income inequality—is among the highest in the world.
Although apartheid as a political system has been replaced by a par-
liamentary democracy, it still makes sense from a socioeconomic per-
spective to speak of four different population groups. White South
Africans have a per capita income similar to that of many European
countries. The Indian population, who came to South Africa when
indentured laborers were needed to work the sugar plantations in
Natal, also has a relatively high income. The average per capita income
of the coloureds (descendents of the Khoi-Khoi, the slaves from
Malaysia and Indonesians and people of mixed blood) is still about
twice that of the Africans.
The high Gini coefficient reflects the very high income differentials
between the different population groups. However, during the past
decade, as black South Africans have been absorbed into the civil ser-
vice and the business class, income inequality among black South
Africans has grown rapidly, with the result that the South African Gini
coefficient remains among the highest in the world even when the
white population is excluded.
Wealth is even more unequally distributed. Under the Land Act of
1913, 87% of all land was made unavailable for black occupation. In
terms of the actual value of the land, white South Africans probably
own well in excess of 90% of all land. With regard to companies listed
on the stock market, white South Africans control about 95%.
C. Education, Health, and Welfare
Regarding education, health, and welfare, it again makes sense to look
at the different population groups separately. In the ’50s, the National
Party destroyed the old mission school system and intentionally cre-
ated an inferior education system for Africans. In the early ’70s, the
National Party realized that the economy would need better-qualified
Africans, and rapidly expanded the secondary schools, but this back-
fired when these schools became the site of the struggle against the
regime. As a result, black schooling continued to be very badly run.
Today, the schools in the black areas still do not function properly.
However, some of the private schools and so-called “Model C”
schools, which are often still predominantly attended by white South
Africans, are quite outstanding.
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In a comparative study of the mathematical and scientific training of
school children in forty countries, South Africa did the worst. On the
other hand, in international mathematics and science competitions, the
top South Africans (predominantly white) usually do well. The quality
of schooling that the average African student receives at the primary
and high school levels is even today very different from that of the
average white student. Many of the predominantly Indian schools
seem to be quite effective, and most coloured schools function much
better than the African schools.
During the past ten years, apartheid in the schools has been done
away with, but in general only black children from a middle class
background are now beginning to attend the better schools. The vast
majority of Africans still find themselves in inferior schools. Now that
the same examinations are written, on a provincial basis, the massive
difference in education is there for all to see. Whereas only a few stu-
dents from African schools obtain distinctions and whereas more than
half the students from many African schools will fail, there are schools
in white areas where close to a third of the students pass their matric
(final school examination) with an A- average.
Although the quality of schooling leaves much to be desired, about
95% of all Africans (of the age school attendance is compulsory) are, in
fact, attending schools. The relatively high degree of access to school-
ing, although at a low standard, was already attained under the previ-
ous regime. As a consequence, the level of illiteracy is less than 20%, if
one accepts the norm that anyone who has attended school for at least
four years is literate. On the other hand, some tests of functional liter-
acy would indicate that only 50% of South Africans can read and com-
prehend fairly straightforward material.
About 80% of all Indians and whites under the age of 18 found
themselves in households where both parents are present. On the
other hand, only about half of the coloureds and a bit more than one-
third of all Africans have both parents in the same household. Thus,
even if the school system is improved quite dramatically, some popu-
lation groups will continue to be better prepared for life than others,
given the assumption that it is important to have both parents at home.
Until 1998, quite a substantial child maintenance grant was paid to
single parents, primarily to single mothers. Although Africans, who in
the past were not paid this grant, could apply for this grant after 1994,
it was still primarily the coloured population that benefited from the
total annual payments of about R1.5 billion when this grant was dis-
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continued and replaced by a means-tested child grant. This grant is
only payable to children under six years of age in needy families, and
amounts to about one-fifth of the maintenance grant. If everyone who
is entitled should apply, the total cost would be of the same magnitude
as the original grant, but the money would reach a much larger num-
ber of kids. The change in system would mean a redistribution from
the relatively poor coloured families to the very poor African families.
With regard to health, there are also marked differences between
the different population groups, which reflect differences in socioeco-
nomic circumstances. For example, about a quarter of all African chil-
dren under six are stunted (too short for their age — a reflection of
chronic malnourishment) and one in ten are underweight for their age.
Among white South African children undernourishment is not a prob-
lem. Malaria and bilharzia are far more common among black South
Africans, as is the incidence of HIV infection. As many as 20 – 25% of
black South African women visiting prenatal clinics in certain areas in
Kwazulu-Natal are HIV positive. Some demographers have projected
that the consequence of all this will be a zero population growth in
South Africa by the year 2010, and that average life expectancy may
fall from about 60 to somewhere in the 40s.
Socioeconomically, the most significant difference is undoubtedly
the very high level of unemployment in the African community with a
very much lower level in the Indian and white communities. Unem-
ployment insurance is only paid out for six months, and then only to
those who have contributed to the scheme for at least two years.
The most significant intervention by government to counter the con-
sequences of unemployment is not in support of those who are of
working age and unemployed, but of those who have reached the offi-
cial retirement ages of 60 for women and 65 for men. The income of
pensioners is means-tested, and those who are poor, often because
they were unemployed for much of their working life, are paid an old
age benefit of about R560. In total, about R10 billion a year is paid out
in the form of these grants.
In the ’60s, the old age grant was primarily to help the white poor.
Blacks had difficulty qualifying for it, and if they did, the amount paid
out was only one-tenth of the grant for whites. However, over time the
differences in the amounts the different groups received was reduced,
and by 1993 parity was brought about. This meant a very significant
increase in the welfare payments to the black community. In many
black rural areas, the old age grant is the major source of income and,
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although it may seem to be quite low, not only the pensioners but
many of their children and grandchildren are supported by it. For
example, half of all unemployed single mothers live in households
where there is a pension income.
D. Changing the Social and Economic Landscape
There is no doubt that the political landscape in South Africa was dra-
matically changed by the transition to majority rule in 1994. Whereas
the most contentious academic debate of the ’60s was the question of
how the political transition was to take place, the question today is
what ought to be done to change the social and economic landscape.
The African National Congress won the election of 1994 for imple-
menting the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). This
program served social and economic transformation on a wide front.
By 1996, the government also adopted a macroeconomic program,
known as Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). This pro-
gram promised to cut the budget deficit from about 6% to 3% by the
turn of the century, and to bring down tax income to 25% of GDP.
The RDP envisaged that government expenditures on social needs
would stimulate economic growth. GEAR foresaw that macroeco-
nomic discipline would lead to greater confidence in the South African
economy and hence more foreign investments, resulting in a higher
rate of economic growth. This would create 300,000–400,000 new jobs.
With regard to the RDP, some of the goals have been met. For exam-
ple, there has been wide scale delivery of electricity and water, and
probably about half of the million houses promised were built. With
regard to GEAR, the deficit targets have been met. In fact, if one con-
siders that some of the government expenditure has been used to build
up the pension fund for government employees in order to fund future
pension payments, the government has brought the deficit down to
about 1%. The free fall of the Rand, which shocked the government
into adopting GEAR, has also been stopped—even though the Rand is
still edging downwards. However, the envisaged new investments
have not been forthcoming.
The supporters of GEAR blame the lack of investment on the very
high interest rates the Reserve Bank has been forced to maintain
because of the crisis in other emergent markets (e.g., Russia and Brazil)
and also on the lack of labor flexibility (one of the GEAR goals was to
create more labor flexibility). The Congress of South African Trade
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Unions and the South African Communist Party, on the other hand,
blame GEAR. They argue that higher deficits would have stimulated
the growth of the economy.
By the time GEAR was adopted, new labor legislation had already
been passed which gave more power to the workers and to the trade
unions and made it more difficult to retrench workers. In addition, an
Equity Act was adopted (to be implemented in the year 2000) requir-
ing companies with a workforce of fifty or more to set targets to trans-
form the gender and racial composition of their labor force.
Although it is interesting to investigate whether these different pol-
icy initiatives are complementary or contradict each other, this path
will not be followed in this essay. Instead, the final section considers
three possible scenarios for transforming the social and economic real-
ity in South Africa. In the process, attention will be given to the role
these and other policies can play in transforming South African reality.
VI. Possible Future Patterns of Social and Economic Transformation
The future pattern of economic development in South Africa is not a
given. Even in the same context, different futures can be realized,
depending on the choices South Africans make. Scenario planning is a
method by which one tries to evaluate the outcomes of different
options. Because the scenarios are told in story form rather than in the
protected discourse of specific paradigms, it is often possible to get a
relative degree of consensus among people with quite divergent points
of departure.
White and black businessmen and progressive black academics par-
ticipated in a scenario exercise coordinated by the author. The result
was interesting. The scenario, called crony capitalism, is the one the
businessmen would have preferred at the outset. When one attempts
to tell it as a logical coherent story, it turns out to have unintended out-
comes. The outcome of the second scenario, called moderate macro-
economic populism, is not unexpected given the fact that those who
participated did not believe in this approach at the outset, but it is a
story which may be difficult to counter even for those who believe in
the underlying policy approach. The third and most successful sce-
nario, called growth and reconstruction, turned out to be more radical
than one would have expected given the group of participants. The
crucial question is whether it is a possible story. Is the outcome fore-
seen a real possibility?
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Each of the participants must judge whether any of these stories
could have been told differently, given the socioeconomic realities in
South Africa and globally. The question is not whether any of these are
the most likely outcome, but whether each of them is possible. Scenar-
ios are not predictions, but simply possible stories of the future which
help one to make better choices today.
This scenario exercise considered possible developments during the
next decade. It is the story about different vehicles that can take South
Africa into the future. The first scenario can hence also be called “Who
Owns the Old Merc(edes)?” The second can be called “Kick-Starting
the Combi Taxi” and the third “The Airbus Takes Off.”
A. Crony Capitalism or Who Owns the Old Merc?
This scenario calls for the continuation of GEAR, with its macroeco-
nomic discipline, together with strong affirmative action policy in
business. Labor market flexibility is assured by significantly reducing
the power of the trade unions. The attempt is to imitate the very amaz-
ing Malaysian story.
The ANC government enters the new millennium under pressure
from various groups to adopt a more populist approach. Since the
leadership is convinced that this would lead to economic disaster, they
strengthen the alliance with Inkatha, the traditional leaders, the emerg-
ing black business class, and the new black bureaucracy. They also
give more power to the military and the police by purchasing new
hardware and implementing measures to ensure political stability,
even though the constitutionality of the powers given to the “securo-
crats” is questioned.
The approach adopted by the government emulates the Malaysian
model. In Malaysia, very high economic growth, averaging about 8%
per year, was realized over the two decades from 1970 to 1990. The
model was based on an authoritarian economic policy, which sidelined
the trade unions and gave a special dispensation to the indigenous
business sector and to foreign companies contemplating investment in
Malaysia.
The strategy had very tangible benefits for the expanding business
class among the indigenous Malaysians. They increased the propor-
tion of the private economy they controlled from virtually nothing to
more than 20%. Given the high economic rate of growth, this means
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that by 1995 the real value of their capital was worth more than all the
capital stock of the 1970 economy.
Since only a relatively small proportion of the indigenous Malays
(also called the Bumiputra or “sons of the soil”) benefited from this
transfer of ownership, inequality among the Bumiputra in terms of
ownership of wealth worsened. Income distribution as measured by
the Gini coefficient got worse, although if one looks at it in terms of the
share in income of the top 20% and the bottom 40%, there was a slight
improvement.
If one bears in mind that an important factor in the rapid growth of
Malaysia was the low cost labor guaranteed to the companies that
invested there, it may seem as though the success of some was
premised on the exploitation of others. However, in the end, virtually
everyone benefited from the high rates of growth. High GDP growth
led to rapid growth in employment and the rapid expansion of rural
development programs. Wages, although originally very low,
increased dramatically over the 25 years to 1995. As a result, the pro-
portion of the really poor declined from nearly 60% of the population
in 1970 to about 15% by 1995. And since the rapid rates of growth
made it possible to implement a widespread affirmative action pro-
gram without too big a cost for the economically dominant Chinese
community, everyone benefited from these policies. The income and
wealth of the Chinese also expanded rapidly, even though not as dra-
matically as that of the Bumiputra.
The ANC government is very sensitive to criticism that the new
South Africa looks far too much like the old, in that whites continue to
be in a very privileged position. In response, the government redou-
bles its efforts to change the demographic profile of both the public
and private sectors. It does so in the private sector by favoring black
companies in its procurement contracts and by a strict application of
the Employment Equity Bill. In the public sector, it appoints people
representative of the demographic profile of the country as quickly as
possible to top management structures. Furthermore, affirmative
action principles are applied in higher education to ensure that South
Africans of African extraction are given preferential access to popular
courses such as medicine and business science.
Affirmative action in education and the implementation of the
Employment Equity Act are resented by the established white, Indian,
and coloured business classes. They soon find that the rapidly emerg-
ing African middle class also shares their concern to guarantee stan-
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dards in former Model C schools and that private sector health care
remains effective and strong. More fundamentally, in conflicts with
Cosatu, emerging black businessmen have the ear of the government,
and increasingly the government acts to shift the balance of power to
the business classes. As a consequence, the initial opposition to affir-
mative action is quite muted. However, when the economic growth
does not pick up, the established business sector starts laying the
blame on the affirmative action policies, claiming that many of the
affirmative action appointees they were forced to hire are incompetent
and that the competitive positions of their firms are being undermined.
They also claim that many of the civil servants appointed under affir-
mative action policies to high ranking positions are not up to doing the
job.
Against the wishes of Cosatu, the government follows the example
of Malaysia and establishes Export Processing Zones in the Eastern
Cape and other areas experiencing high unemployment, and changes
some labor laws to ensure greater flexibility, in the hope that cheap
labor and the right to hire and fire will result in an economic boom
similar to that of Pacific Rim countries.
On the macroeconomic front, things remain much as they were
before. The Department of Finance continues to champion conserva-
tive fiscal policies. South Africa continues to have an acceptable credit
rating. The Rand remains relatively strong because of very high real
interest rates and conservative fiscal policies. The deficit reaches the
3% target, the labor markets are more flexible, and generally South
Africa conforms to the requirements of the Washington consensus.
However, the economic benefits do not materialize.
The attempt to emulate Malaysia fails for a number of reasons.
Whereas Malaysia could provide cheap labor for nearby Japan at a
time when industry was the major growth sector, cheap labor is not the
crucial factor in what is today the major growth sector — the knowl-
edge industries. South Africa does not have a Japan on her doorstep,
desperately looking for cheaper production possibilities. China and
other Pacific Rim countries continue to dominate low-cost industrial
production, thanks to lower wages, higher productivity, better educa-
tion standards, and better management than those found in South
Africa.
In contrast to Malaysia, South Africa does not manage to dramati-
cally improve the education received by the vast majority of South
Africans. Add to this the emigration of many of those with technical
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skills and South Africa is not well placed to join the new technological
revolution.
Low rates of economic growth mean that affirmative action
inevitably takes place at the cost of some people, rather than within the
context of a rapidly expanding economy where opportunities for
everyone can grow.
A further factor that undermines attempts to emulate the Malaysian
model is South Africa’s very progressive Constitution. The trade union
movement mobilizes opposition to Export Processing Zones in South
Africa and to the attempts to create more flexibility in the labor market.
Many of the more strong-armed attempts to bring crime under control,
some of them borrowed from Malaysia, are successfully challenged in
the constitutional court. It seems as though there is, at times, a conflict
between the conditions needed for high economic growth and the
human rights culture defended in the South African Constitution.
In spite of these attempts to follow Malaysia’s example, the South
African economy remains stagnant. The Rand remains relatively
strong because of very high real interest rates and conservative fiscal
policies. Nevertheless, the rate of investment remains low, economic
growth never really takes off, and the slow but sure erosion of capital
and skills from South Africa continues. Business class people and pro-
fessionals of all colors continue to disinvest, because the future is
uncertain. There is some new foreign direct investment, but most of
the foreign funds come in the form of short-term investments in bonds
and equities.
Although growth again picks up in the first years of the millennium,
it does not for any sustained period go much above 3%. Because of the
rapid transformation of the upper echelons of business and govern-
ment, the standard of living of the middle to upper classes of black
South Africans improves dramatically. As a result, the Gini coefficient
for black South Africans grows rapidly. However, savings remain very
low, and new investments can therefore only be financed by further
deficits on the current account. As a consequence, the foreign reserves
decline even further.
While attempts are made to step up delivery to the poor, they have
only a limited impact because of the conservative fiscal practices and
inefficiency in the public service, which has not been improved by the
rapid changes in top management structures. Because of low rates of
economic growth, unemployment continues to increase.
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The government promises to focus on primary health care. In prac-
tice, however, health care is only effectively delivered to the members
of medical aid schemes who can afford to buy private health care.
Cosatu, with an increasing proportion of members also belonging to
the medical aid schemes, in practice accepts the status quo, while in
principle supports a National Health scheme. While more people gain
access to private health care, the quality of service in public health care
declines visibly. The HIV/AIDS epidemic compounds problems expe-
rienced by the public health sector; these problems include a higher
risk of HIV infection in poorer communities that depend on public
health care, and a tendency of the private sector to dump HIV/AIDS
victims on the public health sector as provider of last resort, once
members of medical aids have exhausted their funds. The net effect is
that the quality of health care provided to poorer communities deterio-
rates dramatically.
While affirmative action applies to admission to universities, tradi-
tionally black schools fail to provide a significant improvement in edu-
cation needed for university entrance. Black students wishing to obtain
university education opt to attend former Model C schools, if they can
afford it. However, the educational system as a whole fails to produce
enough black students qualifying for university entrance. In addition,
children from impoverished backgrounds find it virtually impossible
to gain entry to universities, even if they achieve the necessary matric-
ulation results, because funding for higher education remains
restricted.
The trade union movement opposes the focus on the middle class
and resents measures to limit the power of the unions, as well as police
surveillance of their activities. Nevertheless, they find that their politi-
cal clout is diminishing, with more and more of their members being
co-opted into the middle classes. Police intelligence personnel infiltrate
Cosatu, and government adopts various authoritarian measures to
ensure that Cosatu cannot cause “economic havoc.”
For several years, South Africa muddles through in spite of the fail-
ure of the Malaysian model to set it on a sustained path of growth and
development. The only notable attainment of government is that white
privilege is now shared by a rapidly emerging class of black business-
men and government officials. For the mass of people, things have not
changed much, and this leads to growing discontentment. Fluid social,
economic, and political conditions in countries to the north contribute
to the growing malaise.
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The armaments industry sells successfully to countries engaged in
conflict, but the South African economy as a whole continues to stag-
nate. Despite growing xenophobia, an increasing number of illegal
immigrants from the north continue to enter South Africa. Thanks to
its international links, South Africa becomes a center for the interna-
tional drug trade and violent crime undermines social and economic
stability. HIV increasingly affects employed people, with costly social
and economic consequences. Within a decade, there are more than two
million AIDS orphans. In spite of much rhetoric, government can do
little to improve their lot.
The government draws mixed support from the privileged white
sector of the population. Even the new, burgeoning middle class is crit-
ical, despite earlier support. In time, radical pressures become insur-
mountable. A decade from now, South Africa is in turmoil. The poor
increasingly mobilize against exclusion. Illegal settlements, violent
land invasions, and an increasing number of demonstrations get out of
hand. Some unions within Cosatu adopt more radical positions. The
government is accused of favoring the relatively privileged. The com-
plexion of those in leadership positions may well have changed, but
the real concerns of those at the bottom have not been successfully
addressed.
More and more of those with any skills to offer internationally, or
with any funds to spare, emigrate to countries such as Canada, Aus-
tralia, and New Zealand, as well as Botswana and a few other African
countries seeing economic growth. The government tries to manage its
wealth for the benefit of the privileged, but in the end benefits no one.
Government continues to muddle through as the increasingly promi-
nent securocrats suppress any attempts at more radical change. Eco-
nomic development remains modest, though, in spite of strict
adherence to the prescriptions of the World Bank and IMF. Although
there is no imminent collapse, the South African economy continues to
grow far too slowly to meet any of the aspirations of those who remain
excluded. It becomes a more and more divided society.
B. Moderate Macroeconomic Populism or “Kick-Starting 
the Combi Taxi”
In the run up to the local elections in 2001, the ANC government is
well aware that it has failed to meet the expectations of 50% of the elec-
torate who can be classified as very poor. Because there seem to be no
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prospects to realize higher rates of growth under the GEAR policy and
because of the danger of a split within the movement, the government
decides to opt for a more populist strategy. The key to the new policy
is more government spending, especially on social projects, in order to
kick-start the economy. It is claimed that this policy will provide both
growth and redistribution. The policy switch is announced under great
acclaim from Cosatu and the South African Communist Party.
The argument of the new left (or the neo-Keynesians, as they are
sometimes called) is that a significant increase in expenditures is
needed to ensure growth. Instead of favoring old style macroeconomic
populism with deficits well in access of 10%, the left wing of the ANC
successfully pushes for an approach in which increases in government
expenditure are funded both by 3 – 8% increases in the deficit and by
increases in taxes and levies. It targets expenditure in areas where it is
specifically needed, such as housing, education, and health. The
Labour Act and the Employment Equity Acts are, furthermore, radical-
ized in order to ensure a swift transfer of the economy.
A major focus of the new policy is the provision of housing. It is
argued that money spent on the construction industry will of necessity
stimulate the South African rather than the international economy (as
is the case when money is, for example, spent on arms procurement).
The government increases delivery of housing dramatically by becom-
ing more directly involved in housing construction, as it was in the
days of Verwoerd. This leads to a rapid increase in the number of
homes built.
Government is particularly effective in making more land available
for housing development through radical measures, including very
high taxes on undeveloped land in urban areas, which increases its
income. This immediately leads to higher growth rates, and during the
year 2000, the growth rate in the GDP seems to be on its way to exceed
5%.
As part of the new strategy the Department of Health drives
through its policy entitled “Towards a National Health System.” It
increases resources available to the poor by regulating private health
care funding arrangements and by introducing a compulsory Social
Health Insurance System for all formally employed people to fund a
public hospital package. A centrally controlled licensing authority for
private health care and two-year compulsory community service for
newly-qualified doctors help to undermine private health care as an
increasing number of these doctors emigrate.
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While private health care takes the strain, public health services
expand significantly in the first few years. As many clinics are built as
in the first five years, and this time sufficient funds are made available
to staff them with well-trained nurses. However, the growing
HIV/AIDS epidemic, together with the emigration of many of the
more qualified doctors, eventually results in a deterioration.
The government launches a campaign to dramatically improve the
quality of teaching in primary schools in townships and densely popu-
lated rural areas. Education authorities fund the campaign by reallo-
cating a proportion of contributions made by parents of former Model
C schools to disadvantaged schools so that they also can employ addi-
tional teachers, and by relocating some of the best teachers from Model
C schools to previously disadvantaged schools.
The government scraps central examinations in order to make uni-
versity education more accessible to the poor. Assessment is based on
continuous evaluation within individual schools and on the assump-
tion that marks in all schools should reflect an equal proportion of
results. The government eliminates university fees and only subsidizes
those universities that teach in English and have a significant propor-
tion of African students. As a result, student numbers at universities
increase dramatically. However, more affluent parents increasingly
send their children to universities in the United Kingdom and the
United States, as they perceive that South African degrees are being
devalued.
Labor relations acts are strictly enforced to ensure that it is very dif-
ficult to dismiss workers, and new legislation is adopted to give trade
unions a much stronger role in the investment and management deci-
sions of private firms.
Meanwhile, inspectors monitor companies closely to make sure that
they implement the Employment Equity Act. Dissenting companies
appeal to the Constitutional Court on the grounds that the Act requires
them to classify people according to race. The Court upholds the law
claiming that “black” refers to those historically disadvantaged. As a
result, more and more companies try to win the goodwill of the inspec-
tors, by either appointing their friends and relatives or by bribing them
outright.
The aim of government when adopting this new approach was to
generate new growth, which would make it easier to deliver to the
poor. In the short term, this could be possible, but the economy is soon
in crisis. Various factors contribute to this.
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The government’s new policies contribute initially to a growth rate
of about 5%. Attempts to raise taxes to fund this social expenditure are
only partially successful because of increased tax avoidance. The
deficit climbs rapidly to around 8% or 9%. South Africa soon loses its
investor-grade credit rating. In spite of direct intervention to control
capital flight, billions of Rand leave the country. Domestic savings
plummet even further. After the initial growth, which lasts for a year
or two, the economy rapidly declines.
The higher deficit was supposed to stimulate economic growth.
Instead, it promotes more imports. Attempts to counter this trend by
imposing higher import tariffs are not very effective, partly because of
increased corruption, but also because trading partners start closing
markets to South African goods because of South African breaches of
the WTO agreement.
The reality is that the extremely low foreign exchange reserves limit
the government’s capacity to kick-start even minor growth. Even the
very moderate version of macroeconomic populism attempted by the
government runs out of steam very quickly. Initial gains are wiped
out. The Rand starts collapsing and within four to five years it trades at
levels of between R16 and R20 to the dollar. Inflation reaches more
than 30% a year, and foreign exchange reserves are totally depleted.
GDP sees negative growth.
The rapidly expanding black middle class that initially supported
the government’s new policy direction becomes increasingly disillu-
sioned. While jobs are protected by law, trade unions find that increas-
ing numbers of companies are closing down. Deteriorating standards
and escalating costs at former Model C schools and in private health
care also alienate the black middle class. Dissatisfaction among the tra-
ditionally privileged classes reaches very high levels.
Emigration increases dramatically. People leaving include those in
knowledge-based industries in particular, as well as those with basic
management skills. Older whites remain and retire to holiday villages
such as Hermanus and Plettenberg Bay, where they are visited once a
year by their children who have emigrated.
South Africa loses many people with technical and engineering
skills, as well as certified accountants, medical doctors, academics,
teachers, and other professional people. South Africa’s financial man-
agement and engineering capacity deteriorates and its hospitals and
health services experience severe staff shortages. South Africa loses the
capacity to participate in the new knowledge industries on any signifi-
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cant scale. As a result, the benefits of the high-technology revolution
pass South Africa by.
The government encourages immigration of educated Africans
from other countries on the continent to counter the brain drain. It dis-
covers that there is no shortage of people with qualifications in the
social sciences and humanities, but people with high-technology back-
grounds are in short supply. Many of those with the required skills opt
for countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and
Canada. South African salaries and living conditions are not competi-
tive.
Capital flight accompanies the rapid exodus of many of those from
traditionally privileged classes. The government reintroduces
exchange controls to counter this trend. The government forces down
interest rates. Lending institutions keep short-term interest rates low,
but long-term interest rates climb rapidly, in spite of a requirement
that an increasing proportion of all pension and provident funds must
be invested in government bonds.
As often happens when the economy is contracting, a general xeno-
phobia takes hold as increasing numbers of unskilled people from
unstable African countries migrate to South Africa. South Africans are
generally hostile to all migrants, and increasingly oppose appoint-
ments of skilled Africans from other countries to any post in South
Africa.
The failure of South Africa’s economic strategy is a tragedy not only
for the country, but also for the African continent. As Latin America
and more Asian countries join the developed world with per capita
incomes in excess of $10,000, most of sub-Saharan Africa continues to
have per capita incomes of below $1,000 per annum. The rest of the
world writes off Africa as a continent that cannot develop and imple-
ment sustainable economic and social policies.
While the government’s social policies are laudable, the economic
consequences are not what the radical Keynesians anticipated. The
South African government eventually goes, cap in hand, to the IMF
and the World Bank. These institutions demand that South Africa
adopt a new version of GEAR, and scrap or reverse many of the more
progressive programs adopted after the 1999 election. The government
refuses. The economy spins further out of control. Racial tensions
worsen as government blames the white capitalist class for causing the
crisis and the white middle class blames the incompetence of black
politicians and the new black middle class.
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C. Growth and Reconstruction or “The Airbus Takes Off”
After the May 1999 election, South Africa shifts from a country strug-
gling to deal with its past to one with an exciting vision of the future,
thanks to a number of crucial changes. South Africans seem to mature,
having learned that even if they cannot deal with all the problems that
face the country overnight, they must have strategies in place that will
lead to a better future for all in the long run.
The government is well aware that if South Africa fails economi-
cally, Africa will be written off both by the West and the East. Anti-
black racism, which has been just under the surface in many countries
in both the West and East, will grow stronger and stronger. The gov-
ernment also understands that given the dangers of racial conflict and
polarization within South Africa, high economic growth is essential to
reduce inequalities while increasing living standards for most people.
The government also realizes that reconstruction is essential to ensure
that the poor, who are often excluded from the benefits of growth in a
market economy, also benefit. In sum, it must act to ensure that eco-
nomic growth is not just a passing phenomenon.
In arguing the case for economic growth, it is pointed out that under
present circumstances the economy needs to grow at about 5% if
unemployment is to decrease. Growth rates of below 3% in fact mean
the growth of joblessness—something South Africa cannot live with in
the longer run. Furthermore, rapid growth increases the government’s
income and its ability to support the poor. For example, in the case of
Malaysia, government income doubled every ten years without the
need to increase tax rates. Rapid growth thus enables a government to
deal successfully with poverty. It also creates conditions under which
affirmative action policies can be applied successfully.
The government carefully considers obstacles to growth and takes
decisive action to eliminate them. It decides on a number of highly
urgent actions that must be taken immediately to facilitate more rapid
economic growth. The general approach emphasizes delivery to the
really poor, but takes care not to overstretch the capacity of govern-
ment. It creates conditions that allow for rapid changes in the demo-
graphic profile of business and government. At the same time, the
government ensures that established groups also share in rapid eco-
nomic growth, while avoiding a culture of entitlement among the
emerging black business class. It enables labor to protect workers
against exploitation and make a positive contribution to development,
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while also creating a dispensation in which the incompetent and cor-
rupt can be fired. Labor is not allowed to hold the economy at ransom,
nor is it marginalized, as was the case in East Asian Tiger countries.
The government succeeds in taking all sectors on board without being
dominated by any one of them.
While a political balancing act is one of the keys to economic suc-
cess, the government’s success is also well grounded in sound and
well-coordinated economic policies. Immediately after the election,
three steps are taken to improve South Africa’s economic prospects.
The first of these is a radically new approach to crime. The government
realizes that if it wishes to retain the English criminal justice system
(but not the tradition of torture to obtain confessions which was very
much part of the old system), it could only work with a highly efficient
police force and excellent prosecutors. After some attempts to reform
both the police and the system of prosecutions, it realizes that these
goals are only attainable in the longer term. It decides to counter the
increasing tendency for kangaroo courts and the clamor in some quar-
ters for an Islamic system of justice by changing the South African
criminal justice system to be in line with that of continental Europe
and Scandinavia.
The crucial reform in the criminal justice system is the obligation of
the excused, who does not wish to remain silent, to tell his/her story
before knowing the full extent of the state’s case. The advantage of this
system is that it costs far less to prosecute a criminal. Average costs in
France, for example, are one-third that of the U.S. The court cases are
also much shorter. For example, during 1998, only sixteen court cases
in Holland were longer than two days.
In spite of strong resistance from a lobby of criminal lawyers who
fear that their income may be adversely affected, the new system is
implemented. This results in a higher rate of successful prosecutions
than was achieved under the old system. Crime no longer pays so
handsomely as it did when the rate of convictions for many crimes was
extremely low. More funds are also made available to the justice and
the police systems in order to ensure that there is an effective mobiliza-
tion against crime. Soon perceptions with regard to crime change
inside and outside South Africa.
Secondly, very successful attempts are made to differentiate South
Africa from other emerging markets. For example, statistics are pub-
lished which show that South Africa’s level of debt is not rapidly
increasing, as the published national accounts previously led one to
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conclude. In addition, it also becomes known in the marketplace that if
the future pension obligations of governments are included, then
South Africa’s debt position is dramatically more healthy than that of
countries such as Brazil or Italy. And in the campaign to gain more
tourists, not only the wildlife and beautiful environment but also the
excellent infrastructure and the high quality services available in fields
such as medicine are stressed.
Thirdly, partly as a consequence of the success of the anti-crime
measures and the information campaign to differentiate South Africa,
it is possible for the Reserve Bank to significantly lower the real inter-
est rates, regardless of the fact that such a change in policy may under-
mine the Rand in the short term. The Rand does devalue quite
dramatically initially, but subsequently recovers much of the ground
lost thanks to increased export earnings and a decline in luxury
imports. The lower real interest rates lead to a significant increase in
gross domestic investments, both by local and foreign investors. A
change in the taxation policy to only tax real and nominal interest
leads to an increase in savings.
Finally, changes in public administration play a key role in estab-
lishing South Africa’s unexpected economic success. The new govern-
ment shows itself to be fully committed to implementing good policies
effectively. It launches an effective campaign against corruption. It
tempers affirmative action policies to ensure that government capacity
does not suffer. New cadres of well-trained civil servants who can
translate rhetoric into reality increasingly replace old bureaucrats and
the first generation who, at times, were political appointees.
As a consequence of the above steps, which could all be taken
within a relatively short period, the economic growth rate is soon
exceeding 4% per annum. In the longer run, other changes in govern-
ment policy and in the broader environment lead to even higher rates
of economic growth.
While these policy changes alone would have contributed to signifi-
cant economic development in South Africa, the African continent also
experiences significant political and economic progress. While Africa
was generally written off at the dawn of the new millennium, the con-
tinent now sees significant development. South Africa plays a key role
in this development, and benefits considerably from it.
The tourist industry expands by 20%, as increasing numbers of
tourists, particularly from Europe, discover South Africa. The country
owes the success of the tourism industry largely to effective measures
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to combat crime, a well-planned advertising campaign funded by the
Ministry of Tourism and the Environment, and successful steps by the
Ministry of Trade and Industry to raise the levels of service provided
by the industry. The success of the tourism industry is crucial for eco-
nomic growth in South Africa and a number of its neighbors. The gov-
ernment ends the virtual monopoly of South African Airlines (SAA) to
fly directly from Europe to cities such as Cape Town, which also helps
to promote tourism. More tourists visit South Africa by 2020 than Aus-
tralia. The tourism industry creates millions of new jobs and helps to
expand South Africa’s foreign reserves dramatically.
While South Africa finds it very difficult to compete with labor
intensive industries in countries such as China, it develops niche mar-
kets successfully in the clothing and textile sector where design is an
important factor. Furthermore, South Africa’s highly developed finan-
cial services sector benefits greatly from infrastructure development in
Africa, which follows the write-off of debt for the poorer countries. The
construction sector grows particularly rapidly because of lower inter-
est rates in South Africa and new opportunities in the countries to the
north. Crucial for overall economic development is a new emphasis on
retaining and developing technical and information technology skills
needed to fully exploit the benefits of the information age.
In education and training, the new Minister implements both
longer-term visions and immediate improvements in management
systems. The business sector gets involved in a very proactive way to
assist with the improvements in the quality of education. The govern-
ment enforces central examination standards similar to those found in
many countries in the East, which ensures that the quality of students
entering higher education improves dramatically. Effective manage-
ment systems in education also guarantee that teachers who do not
perform adequately leave the system. Education authorities focus in
particular on promoting the work ethic, multi-lingualism, and the
development of technical skills needed for the information age, even at
the primary school level. Schools place considerable emphasis on new
teaching technologies, especially in mathematics and science, where
there is a shortage of qualified teachers. Schools also integrate new
technologies to ensure that increasing numbers of learners have the
skills needed to join the information age.
Priorities in education include establishing more Model C-type
schools and providing bursaries and scholarships, which make it pos-
sible for people from disadvantaged backgrounds to attend these
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schools. Education authorities launch a major drive to provide basic
quantitative skills needed for the country to compete in high technol-
ogy fields. A large number of the teachers who do not have the ability
to meet the requirements of the new education system are replaced by
young, dynamic teachers. Instead of lowering standards to the lowest
common denominator, education authorities make sure that there are
an increasing number of schools that can now compete with the best in
the world.
Universities expand quite rapidly as an increasing number of well-
qualified students leave the school system. Scholarships and affirma-
tive action selection requirements enable any student with ability from
a disadvantaged background to acquire a good education. Disadvan-
tage is determined by economic and class criteria, rather than race.
University standards, under threat at the turn of the new millennium,
improve dramatically. Some universities, however, become “techni-
cons” to provide more specific skills.
In the field of labor relations, participatory models, which were so
effective in encouraging higher productivity in countries such as
Japan, are enforced with new vigor. However, the government modi-
fies high minimum wages and job security measures to maximize
employment opportunities. While labor is given a much greater say,
the government also ensures much greater labor market flexibility.
Rapid economic growth also helps to resolve conflict over applica-
tions of the Employment Equity Act, the use of procurement contracts
to further affirmative action policies, and affirmative action in educa-
tion. Thanks to a growth rate of between 5% and 6%, the complexion of
management and the labor force in general changes rapidly. Measures
to police implementation of the Employment Equity Act, resented by
business, are scrapped. Instead, the Act facilitates integration into the
higher echelons of the economy of those who have been traditionally
excluded.
Within the welfare system, the government saves more than a bil-
lion Rand by eliminating fraud and corruption and by establishing
more effective delivery systems. The means-test is abolished for old
age and child grants. This leads to less corruption, more effective
delivery of these grants, and higher overall savings. Central to the new
approach is a basic income grant, which is paid out to women taking
care of children on the basis of the number of people in the household.
This money is paid out to all who register. Although the initial
amounts are low, they are sufficient to make a difference. However, it
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grows at the same rate as the real per capita income, and by the end of
the first decade of the new millennium it has gone up by about 80%.
NGOs play a much more active role in delivering social services.
Together with tax breaks for companies making a direct contribution
to social welfare and education, this results in rapid improvement.
New monitoring systems play a major role in ensuring that govern-
ment can evaluate the real impact of changes in economic and social
policy. It soon becomes clear that the informal sector, if suitably sup-
ported by government, can provide a minimum living standard for all
those who do not benefit from the rapidly expanding formal employ-
ment opportunities.
Increased resources available to both the private and public health
sectors yield positive interaction between the two sectors, leading to
improvement of overall health care available. While the emerging
AIDS/HIV epidemic results in a massive human tragedy, much is
done to reverse the rate of infection. Effective measures take care of the
AIDS orphans. AIDS is dealt with in a humane but affordable and
rational manner. Care is taken to ensure that the health care system is
not destroyed by unreasonable expectations about health care for
AIDS patients.
The private health sector and some academic hospitals in the public
sector earn foreign exchange increasingly as patients from the First
World countries take advantage of excellent health care at reasonable
prices. Profits are ploughed back to further improve the quality of
South African medical services.
As it becomes clear that these changes are real, South African com-
panies that have moved offshore to escape rampant crime and a
declining Rand return most operations to South Africa. They return
primarily because of the burgeoning economy and the growth of some
industries, and because of tax reform, which includes lower taxes and
incentives for settling in South Africa. Tax reform is designed to attract
high technology companies in particular, that are also attracted by the
country’s favorable climate, environment, high rates of growth, and
good schools.
Institutional investment in South Africa increases dramatically. This
is partly the result of different perceptions of South Africa given the
changes in the investor climate following settlements in the Congo and
in Angola. However, it also has much to do with a better understand-
ing of South Africa’s extremely low levels of debt compared to most
other countries. Steps taken by the Reserve Bank to draw attention to
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the health of the economy include placing most of the country’s pen-
sion debt on the public record. Telkom, Transnet, and SAA are priva-
tized to reduce South Africa’s debt further, which enhances South
Africa’s standing in international markets, improving the country’s
international debt grading.
An unexpected bonus of the tourist boom is a significant increase in
the number of foreign businessmen who decide to invest in South
Africa and to spend part of the year in the country. The government
targets particular types of foreign investors who may feel at home in
South Africa, such as those from the United Kingdom, Germany, and
India.
Given all these developments, it is not surprising that the Rand sta-
bilizes. Although real interest rates remain much lower than they were
in the late ’90s, South Africans are now far more likely to retain their
surplus assets in South Africa. The continuous devaluation of the Rand
is no longer seen as inevitable. The savings and investment rate climbs
gradually into the high twenties for the first time in more than two
decades. Inflation remains below 4% per annum. All indications are
that a growth rate in excess of 5% is here to stay.
While taxes are reduced, overall tax income rapidly increases, partly
because of increases in taxes that are more difficult to avoid, such as
Value Added Tax. However, an important factor is greater willingness
on the part of taxpayers to pay. The government uses both the carrot
and the stick to encourage people to pay their taxes. Business is
encouraged to feel less threatened and to feel part of the new South
Africa, and to understand the long-term benefits of its contribution.
However, bad habits do not die easily, and the government has to
impose stiff penalties on tax evaders. Once higher growth rates are
achieved, tax income grows rapidly, and the government can fund
social delivery more effectively.
Meanwhile, broader political developments in sub-Saharan Africa
ensure stability on the continent, which also helps development in
South Africa. Dramatic changes in Zimbabwe help to pull Africa back
from a long and destructive period of warfare. South Africa uses its
strong military position to ensure lasting peace in the Congo and
Angola. This, together with a new, progressive, and democratic gov-
ernment in Nigeria, creates conditions for an African Renaissance in
which Africa becomes an economic powerhouse in the first few
decades of the new millennium. By 2020, Africa south of the Sahara
has changed dramatically.
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South Africa Development and Economic Community (SADEC)
becomes an African equivalent of Mercosur, with South Africa playing
the leading role, similar to that played by Brazil in South America. The
new Zimbabwe also plays a crucial role, with Harare becoming for the
SADEC region the equivalent of Brussels in the European Union.
Trade barriers between SADEC countries are successfully removed.
South Africa, at a very early stage, removes exchange controls and
allows companies to list on other markets, once certain prudential
requirements have been met. In spite of attempts by most SADEC
countries to strengthen their own currencies, the Rand effectively
becomes the common currency for the entire region within a decade.
This gives momentum to negotiations to establish one currency for the
entire region, the Afro, but this move does not immediately gain the
support of the leaders with more nationalistic leanings. Meanwhile,
South Africa benefits significantly from a major trade agreement
signed with the European Union in 1999.
For South Africa, the dividends of peace in Africa are very dramatic.
After the debt write-off (the contribution of the West to the settlement
of the African conflicts), interest and capital repayments no longer take
up the bulk of the budget of African countries. They can now receive
new loans, which can be used more productively. Angola and the
Congo join SADEC. In Angola, much of the additional finance is used
to redevelop infrastructure and mining. South African companies play
a major role in development in other African countries. In fact, South
Africa provides a gateway for new technology, transport, and financial
services to the SADEC region, thanks to its ability to deliver high qual-
ity services. Other companies, particularly those who emphasize part-
nerships with local entrepreneurs, are very successful in expanding to
the rapidly developing countries to the north.
The African renaissance helps to increase the rate of economic
growth in South Africa by an additional 1% to 2%, to guarantee aver-
age overall growth of more than 5% needed to ensure both growth and
redistribution in South Africa, and encourages both economic and
social development. Without the African renaissance, this growth
would have been difficult to achieve. At the same time, the African
renaissance would have been impossible without economic growth in
South Africa.
By 2010, South Africa has virtually doubled its per capita income.
When the 2012 Olympic torch is carried into the newly completed sta-
dium in Cape Town, it is welcomed by spectators who know that their
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country has made a dramatic transition from a divided, underdevel-
oped society to a modern, technologically advanced, economically
prosperous and politically stable democracy.
VII. Reality, Fears and Dreams?
Social scientists have been notoriously bad in their predictions of how
societies are likely to change. Scenario planning is an attempt to get
away from predicting and instead to investigate the future possibili-
ties. The crucial question is not whether any of the scenarios told above
are likely to happen. None of them are, in fact, likely to be realized.
The crucial question is, rather, whether these stories are reasonable
possibilities — whether things could turn out the way the story pre-
dicts. This is a question that depends on the paradigm in which one
has been brought up and on the cultural and other biases one may
have. The underlying assumption of a scenario exercise is, though, that
there is no insurmountable obstacle to dialogue and understanding —
that one can, in the end, agree on a scenario as a possible future, even
though one may continue to disagree on what is the most desirable
future.
A question of particular interest is what other possible social and
economic developments could take place. What are the other stories
that could be told? Clearly, there is a virtually infinite range of other
outcomes possible. These specific stories have been chosen because
they engage in a dialogue with current thinking in South Africa.
This essay has probably been overambitious. It has attempted to
give an understanding of past patterns of social and economic devel-
opment, of present realities, and of future possibilities. To do full jus-
tice to all these issues one probably needs to write a book rather than
an essay, and one needs to offer a course rather than a single lecture. It
is hoped that this exercise will nevertheless stimulate discussion and
encourage critical thinking not only about the South Africans’ under-
standing of the past and present, but also about our dreams for the
future. 
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Notes
1. Tycho de Brah was an astrologer who advised the king of Denmark both in matters of
state and with regard to personal questions—e.g., on which day his daughter should get
married. He recorded very accurate observations of the movements of the planets, which
enabled Copernicus to formulate his theories of the elliptical movement of the planets
around the sun. However, when he predicted the future, his scientific observations
surely were of as limited value as are the impressive time series data on which the mod-
ern day econometricians rely.
2. Lenin drew on some of the insights of J.A. Hobson.
3. In South Africa, the term refers both to those committed to the free market—neo-liber-
als in today’s terminology — and also, as is the case in the United States, to those with a
strong social conscience and an inclination to welfare state types of policies.
4. This is the name that was adopted for the African reserves by critics of the government
as an alternative to the official designation of “Homelands.”
5. Nowadays about 40% of all Africans are unemployed. In fact, in surveys, black South
Africans see unemployment as the biggest single social problem.
6. The recent census probably undercounted the population by at least a million, so let us
say that the actual population is somewhere between 43 and 44 million.
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